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Abstract. We consider a non-cooperative price bargaining model between a monopolistic producer
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rates, but by sequences of discount factors varying in time. We assume that the sequence of discount
rates of a party can be arbitrary, with the only restriction that the infinite series that determines
the utility for the given party must be convergent. Under certain parameters, the price negotiation
model coincides with wage bargaining with the exogenous always strike decision. We determine the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in this model for no-delay strategies independent of the former
history of the game. Then we relax the no-delay assumption and determine the highest equilibrium
payoff of the seller and the lowest equilibrium payoff of the buyer for the general case. We show
that the no-delay equilibrium strategy profiles support these extreme payoffs.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Brief literature overview
The paper concerns price bargaining – undoubtedly an important issue in most economic
and market negotiations. In such a bargaining, a seller wants to sell his product at a
highest price to maximize his profit whereas a buyer wants to buy it at a lowest price to
maximize his surplus. If the seller and buyer do not agree on a price, then there will be
no transaction.
Numerous works are devoted to price bargaining between sellers and buyers. Non-
cooperative two-person sequential bargaining models are used to examine the bargaining
behavior in different kinds of markets. Frequently the analysis takes notice of reference
points – the concept introduced in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979);
Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992)). Some reference points are external such as pre-
vious paid prices or market values (Kahneman (1992); Kristensen and Gaerling (1997b);
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Northcraft and Neale (1987)), and others are internal such as reservation price or aspi-
ration price (Kristensen and Gaerling (1997a)). In the price bargaining literature, it is
still unclear what are the internal reference points. Kristensen and Gaerling (1997a) use
an experimental study for determining the reference points of bargaining price and show
the importance of reservation prices of both sellers and buyers in a competitive market.
A reservation price is the point at which the bargainers are indifferent to accept or reject
the offer of the other party. In other words, in a seller-buyer bargaining, it is the max-
imum (minimum) price at which the buyer (seller) is willing to buy (sell) the product.
Kristensen and Gaerling (1997a) find in their experiment that if the expected market
price is lower and the first offer is higher than the reservation price, then using it as a
reference point will not be significant. However, White et al. (1994) find that a buyer’s
reservation price is the most important reference point for the buyers. Kwon et al. (2009)
create a reservation price reporting mechanism by using an experimental study. Poucke
and Buelens (2002) introduce the notion of an offer zone, which is the difference between
aspiration price and initial offer, and study its influence on the negotiated outcome, by
running simulated seller-buyer negotiations between managers.
Many works on non-cooperative two-person bargaining models are based on Rubin-
stein (1982b) formulation of sequential bargaining process in discrete time with alter-
nating offers and counteroffers and on the determination of subgame perfect equilibria
(abbreviated here as SPE). Time and information are important elements in these mod-
els. Some authors consider one-sided or two-sided asymmetric information and present
models of sequential bargaining under incomplete information. Price bargaining between
manufacturer and distributor under asymmetric and incomplete information of distrib-
utor’s knowledge about buyers’ reservation price is tested in an experimental study of
sequential bargaining by Srivastava et al. (2000). Feri and Gantner (2011) modify Ru-
binstein’s sequential bargaining model by two-sided incomplete information and study
experimentally price bargaining. Cramton (1991) adds transaction cost to Rubinstein’s
sequential bargaining model with asymmetric information. Gul and Sonnenschein (1988)
identify the delay to agreement with a screening process of a price bargaining model be-
tween a buyer and a seller where there exists an uncertainty about the valuation of one
party.
An important issue in non-cooperative bargaining models concerns preferences of bar-
gainers, in particular, non-stationarity of preferences. Although several works emphasize
that stationary bargaining models are rare in real-life situations (e.g., Cramton and Tracy
(1994)), models with discount factors varying in time do not receive enough attention so
far. Non-stationarity of parties’ preferences in the original Rubinstein model is discussed,
e.g., in Binmore (1987), Coles and Muthoo (2003). Also Rusinowska (2001, 2002, 2004)
generalizes the original model of Rubinstein to bargaining models with preferences de-
scribed by sequences of discount rates or/and bargaining costs varying in time. Ozkardas
and Rusinowska (2012) propose a union-firm wage bargaining model in which preferences
are described by discount rates varying in time and strike decision is given exogenously.
Trefler (1999) modifies Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) bargaining framework by adding
the Markov process of pairwise matching to analyze the impact of market supply and
demand on bilateral bargaining outcomes. Dickinson (2003) introduces the importance
of risk preferences on the bargaining outcomes in price negotiation.
2
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.66
Price bargaining models are frequently tested by laboratory experiments (Roth and
Kagel (1995)). For example, price bargaining on perishable goods market is studied ex-
perimentally by Moulet and Rouchier (2008) to determine the effects of time on sequential
bargaining model. Cason et al. (2003) compare posted price versus bilateral bargaining
price by using laboratory experiments and find that the bargaining price is higher and
sticker than posted prices. Other studies use field experiments for reference points of price
bargaining (Abdul-Muhmin (2001)).
Although price negotiation between a seller and a buyer can be seen as a microeco-
nomic problem, several authors apply price negotiation models to macroeconomic issues.
Application of price bargaining to international trade between two countries over two
non-storable goods is analyzed by Ferna´ndez-Blanco (2012). Oczkowski (1999) applies
Nash bargaining framework to an econometric analysis of price and quantity bargaining
model.
1.2 The present paper
We consider a monopolistic seller that sells a unique and indivisible good in a market
with only one buyer. They bargain over the price of the product by making alternating
offers. Initial offer is made by the seller and the buyer is free to either accept or reject
it. If he rejects the offer, then it is his turn to make a new offer. We use therefore
Rubinstein’s bargaining procedure (Rubinstein (1982a)), but similarly as in Rusinowska
(2001) we generalize the model by assuming that preferences of each party are expressed
by discount factors varying in time. There are several differences between the present
model and the model analyzed in Rusinowska (2001). In the latter, two players bargain
over a division of one unit of infinitely divisible good and the utility of a player is given
by the discounted agreement (i.e., the discounted part of the good received by the given
player). In our model, the seller and the buyer bargain over the price of a good, the payoffs
are different from the ones defined in Rusinowska (2001), and the utility of a bargainer
is given by the discounted sums of the payoffs from period 0 to infinity. We assume that
the sequence of discount rates of a party can be arbitrary, with the only restriction that
the infinite series that determines the utility for the given party must be convergent.
Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2012) consider a wage bargaining in which a union and a
firm bargain over a wage contract and the union may go on strike if an offer is rejected.
They analyze subgame perfect equilibria under exogenous strike decisions and for history
independent strategies with no delay. Under some assumptions on the parameters in the
model, the utilities of the seller and the buyer coincide with the utilities of the union and
the firm in the wage bargaining in which the union commits to go on strike whenever
there is a disagreement (Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2012)). Consequently, the particular
case of wage bargaining can be applied to the price negotiation model.
In the present paper, first we restrict our analysis to history independent strategies
with no delay which means that an offer of a player is independent of the previous offers
of the players and when a player has to make an offer, his equilibrium offer is accepted by
the other party. Similarly as in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2012), we determine the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium for no-delay strategies independent of the former history of
the game. Then we relax the no-delay assumption and determine the highest equilibrium
payoff of the seller and the lowest equilibrium payoff of the buyer for the general case.
We show that the no-delay equilibrium strategy profiles support these extreme payoffs.
3
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Our approach to the analysis of equilibrium payoffs in the price bargaining is similar to
the one used in Houba and Wen (2008) who apply the method by Shaked and Sutton
(1984) to derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining introduced
in Fernandez and Glazer (1991). However, while preferences of the union and firm in the
model of Fernandez and Glazer (1991) are constant in time, in our model the seller and
the buyer have preferences varying in time.
Section 2 describes the price bargaining model with discount rates varying in time. In
Section 3 we determine the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the model, when we
restrict the analysis to history independent strategies with no delay. Then we we analyze
equilibrium payoffs for the general model without the restriction to no-delay strategies.
In Section 4 we conclude and mention our future research agenda. To make the paper self-
contained, in the Appendix we present proofs of all the results stated in the present paper,
although some of the proofs are very similar to the ones concerning wage bargaining with
the exogenous ‘always strike’ decision and presented in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2012).
2 The Model
We introduce a model of price negotiation between a seller and a buyer on a unique
indivisible product. We suppose that the seller is in a monopolistic situation and the
buyer is monopsone which means that the market is constituted by two players.
Buyer has a reservation price of R for the unique product and he buys it for personal
satisfaction. His reservation price is an indicator of the buyer’s willingness to buy. If the
buyer cannot obtain the product, he pays a dissatisfaction cost of D. On the other hand,
if he gets the product, he has a positive satisfaction gain of S, where R ≥ S ≥ D ≥ 0.
The seller desires to sell the product and to make a positive and maximum profit. If the
seller cannot sell it, he pays a cost of 0 < C ≤ S + D of producing the product. The
bargaining procedure between the seller and the buyer is the following. Two parties (the
seller and the buyer) bargain sequentially over discrete time and a potentially infinite
horizon. They alternate in making offers of price that the other party is free either to
accept or to reject.
Let P 2ts denote the offer of the seller made in an even-numbered period 2t, where
t ∈ N, and let P 2t+1b denote the offer of the buyer made in an odd numbered period
2t+1. The range of the proposed price is [0, S +D], i.e., neither the seller nor the buyer
can propose a price above the sum of the satisfaction value and the dissatisfaction cost.
In period 0 the seller proposes P 0s , and if the buyer accepts this price, than the agreement
is reached and the payoffs in period 0 are (P 0s − C,R− P
0
s + S). If the buyer rejects
it, then the payoffs in period 0 are (−C,R−D), and it is the buyer’s turn to make a
counter-offer P 1b in period 1. If the seller accepts this offer, then the payoffs in period 1
are (P 1b − C,R− P
1
b + S). Otherwise, the payoffs in period 1 are (−C,R−D), and the
seller makes a new offer in the next period. This procedure goes on until an agreement is
reached.
In the price negotiation, preferences of the seller and the buyer are described by
sequences of discount factors varying in time, (δs,t)t∈N and (δb,t)t∈N, respectively, where
δs,t is the discount factor of the seller in period t ∈ N, δs,0 = 1, 0 < δs,t < 1 for t ≥ 1 and
δb,t is the discount factor of the buyer in period t ∈ N, δb,0 = 1, 0 < δb,t < 1 for t ≥ 1.
4
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The result of the price negotiation is either a pair (P, T ), where P ∈ [0, S +D] is
the agreed price of the product and T ∈ N is the number of periods before reaching the
agreement, or a disagreement denoted by (d,∞) and meaning the situation in which the
parties never reach an agreement.
For each t ∈ N, we introduce the following notation:
δs (t) :=
t∏
k=0
δs,k, δb (t) :=
t∏
k=0
δb,k, for 0 < t
′
≤ t, δs (t
′, t) =
t∏
k=t′
δs,k, δb (t
′, t) =
t∏
k=t′
δb,k
The utility of the result (P, T ) for the seller, where S +D ≥ P ≥ 0 and T ∈ N, is equal
to
Us (P, T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δs (t) us (t) (1)
where us (t) = P − C for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then us (t) = −C for each 0 ≤ t < T .
The utility of the result (P, T ) for the buyer is equal to
Ub (P, T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δb (t) ub (t) (2)
where ub (t) = R − P + S for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then ub (t) = R − D for each
0 ≤ t < T , where R ≥ S ≥ D ≥ 0 and S +D ≥ P ≥ 0.
The utilities of the disagreement for the seller and the buyer are equal to
Us (d,∞) = −C
∞∑
t=0
δs (t) , Ub (d,∞) = (R−D)
∞∑
t=0
δb (t)
At the seller’s side, when the agreement (P, T ) is reached, his payoff in every period
t ≥ T will be equal to us (t) = P − C, i.e., to the difference between the price and the
production cost. If P ≥ C, the seller will make profit from this agreement. On the other
hand, if the agreement is not reached in period T , then the seller’s payoff at period T
will be us (T ) = −C, i.e., the production cost which is equal to the lost of the seller.
We therefore assume that the product can be used only within one period and must be
produced each time when a new period starts.
For the buyer, the agreement (P, T ) gives to the buyer in every period t ≥ T the
payoff equal to ub (t) = R − P + S, i.e., to the difference between his reservation price
for that product and the agreement price, plus the satisfaction value for obtaining the
product. Hence, the buyer’s payoff in the agreement has two components: the surplus of
the buyer which is the amount of money that stays in his pocket and the satisfaction
value that comes from obtaining the product. In case of a disagreement, the payoff level
of the buyer in period T is equal to ub (T ) = R − D, i.e., to the difference between the
reservation price and the cost of the disagreement. This means that the buyer suffers
from not obtaining the product, but he still has some money in his pocket.
Remark 1 Note that if R = D = 1−S and C = 0, then we recover the wage bargaining
with discount rates varying in time, where the union commits to strike whenever there is
a disagreement; see Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2012).
5
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The utilities for both parties depend on the infinite series, so we need to well define
the sequences of discount rates. What are the conditions for convergence of these infinite
series?
Remark 2 The necessary conditions for the convergence of the infinite series which
define Us (P, T ) and Ub (P, T ) in (1) and (2) are
δs(t)→t→+∞ 0 and δb(t)→t→+∞ 0 (3)
but these are not sufficient conditions. The necessary conditions come immediately from
the necessary condition of the convergence of the infinite series. To see that these are not
sufficient conditions, consider δb,k =
k
k+1
for each k ≥ 1, δb,0 = 1. Then
δb(t) =
1
2
·
2
3
· · ·
t
t+ 1
=
1
t+ 1
→t→+∞ 0
If the agreement P is reached immediately, then Ub(P, 0) = (R− P + S)
∑
∞
t=0
1
t+1
which
is a divergent series. Similarly, if P is reached in a certain period T > 0, then Ub (P, T ) =∑T−1
t=0 δb(t)ut + (R− P + S)
∑
∞
t=T
1
t+1
.
Remark 3 If (δs,t)t∈N and (δb,t)t∈N are bounded by a certain number smaller than 1, i.e.,
if
there exist Φs < 1 and Φb < 1 such that δs,t ≤ Φs and δb,t ≤ Φb for each t ∈ N (4)
then the series which define Us (P, T ) and Ub (P, T ) in (1) and (2) are convergent. We
have for each t ∈ N
0 ≤ δb(t) (R− P + S) ≤ (Φb)
t (R− P + S)
Let the agreement P be reached immediately. Since
∑
∞
t=0(Φb)
t is the convergent geometric
series, by virtue of the comparison test, Ub(P, 0) is also convergent. The proof is similar,
if P is reached in a certain period T > 0 and it is analogous for the seller. The sufficient
conditions given in (4) are not necessary conditions. To see that, consider δb,k =
k
k+2
for
each k ≥ 1, δb,0 = 1. The sequence does not satisfy the condition (4). However, we have
δb(t) =
1
3
·
2
4
· · ·
t
t+ 2
=
2
(t+ 1)(t+ 2)
→t→+∞ 0
If the agreement P is reached immediately, then Ub(P, 0) = (R− P + S)
∑
∞
t=1
2
(t+1)(t+2)
which is convergent by virtue of the comparison test: 1
t2
≥
1
(t+1)(t+2)
and we know that∑
∞
t=1
1
t2
is convergent. The proof is similar, if P is reached in a certain period T > 0.
Not only every decreasing sequence (δs,t)t∈N ((δb,t)t∈N, respectively) satisfies (4) and
gives the convergent series defined in (1) ((2), respectively) but also some increasing
sequences do that; see, e.g., δb,k =
1
3
−
1
3k+3
for each k ≥ 1.
Remark 4 We restrict our analysis to the case in which the discount rates satisfy con-
dition (4). Hence, in particular, for each t ∈ N,
∞∑
k=2t+1
δs(2t+ 1, k) ≤
Φs
1− Φs
,
∞∑
k=2t+2
δb(2t+ 2, k) ≤
Φb
1− Φb
(5)
6
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3 The Results
3.1 Subgame perfect equilibrium of the model
First, we find the unique SPE if we restrict our analysis to strategies independent of the
former history of the game and with no-delay. We introduce the following notation for
every t ∈ N+
∆s(t) =
∑
∞
k=t δs(t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δs(t, k)
, ∆b(t) =
∑
∞
k=t δb(t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δb(t, k)
(6)
Hence, we have also
1−∆s(t) =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δs(t, k)
, 1−∆b(t) =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δb(t, k)
(7)
and for every t ∈ N+
∆s(t) ≤ Φs and ∆b(t) ≤ Φb (8)
Proposition 1 Consider the price bargaining model in which preferences of the seller
and the buyer are described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N, where δi,0 = 1,
0 < δi,t < 1 for t ≥ 1, i = s, b. Consider the following family of strategies (ss, sb):
in each period 2t + 1 the seller accepts an offer y of the buyer if and only if y ≥ P 2t+1b ,
and in each period 2t the buyer accepts an offer x of the seller if and only if x ≤ P 2ts ,
where P 2ts is an offer of the seller in 2t and P
2t+1
b is an offer of the buyer in 2t+ 1.
Then (ss, sb) is a SPE of this game if and only if the offers satisfy the following infinite
system of equations for each t ∈ N:
R− P 2ts + S = (R−D) (1−∆b(2t+ 1)) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
)
∆b (2t+ 1) (9)
P 2t+1b − C = −C(1−∆s(2t+ 2)) +
(
P 2t+2s − C
)
∆s (2t+ 2) (10)
For the proof of Proposition 1, see the Appendix.
Proposition 1 presents necessary and sufficient conditions for the profile (ss, sb) to
be a SPE. The first equation means that the buyer is indifferent between accepting the
equilibrium offer of the seller and rejecting that offer. Similarly, the second equation
expresses indifference of the seller between accepting and rejecting the equilibrium offer
of the buyer. By solving the infinite system (9) and (10), we determine the equilibrium
offers proposed under the strategies (ss, sb) and show that this SPE is unique.
Proposition 2 Consider the price bargaining model with preferences of the seller and the
buyer described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N, where δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1
for t ≥ 1, i = s, b. Then there is the unique SPE of the form (ss, sb) stated in Proposition
1, in which the offers of the parties, for every t ∈ N, are given by
P 2ts = (S +D)
(
1−∆b(2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆b(2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆s(2j + 2)∆b(2j + 1)
)
(11)
P 2t+1b = P
2t+2
s ∆s (2t+ 2) (12)
7
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For the proof of Proposition 2, see the Appendix.
We could expect that in the price negotiation model the agreed prices (P 2ts ) and(
P 2t+1b
)
would depend on the reservation price R, the dissatisfaction cost D, the satisfac-
tion value S, the production cost C and the discount factors (δs,t) and (δb,t), since in the
literature they are usually supposed to be the reference points of the price determina-
tion. However, the results obtained in our model show that there is no dependence of the
agreement price level on some of these determinants. More precisely, the offered prices
at the equilibrium depend only on the sum of the dissatisfaction cost and satisfaction
value of the buyer, and on the discount rates of both parties. In particular, this means
that when proposing a price the seller does not care about his production cost but he
does care about the (dis)satisfaction values of the buyer. The higher these values are,
the higher the prices offered by the seller and the buyer are, i.e., if the buyer is highly
attached to the product and the seller knows that, the seller will offer higher prices and
the buyer will accept it. Moreover, the more patient the seller will be in the future, the
higher the prices offered by both parties are.
In the market with only one seller and one buyer, both parties do not have any other
alternatives and they want to reach an agreement quickly. If there were other buyers in
the market that desired to buy the product, the monopolistic seller could make higher
profits. On the other hand, if there were many sellers that wanted to sell their products,
the buyer could find lower prices. The market with many sellers and buyers gives the
perfect competition situation. In our model with one seller and one buyer, it seems natural
that the price does not depend on the production cost or the reservation price. However,
the reservation price which indicates the buyer’s willingness to buy and the production
cost of the seller will determine the payoffs of the parties in every period as defined in (1)
and (2). Indeed, note that in a single period the sum of the agreement payoffs is equal to
(R + S − C) and the sum of the disagreement payoffs is equal to (R−D − C).
3.2 On equilibrium payoffs for the general model
Next we relax the no-delay assumption that strategies are of the form (ss, sb), and we
determine the highest SPE payoff of the seller and the lowest SPE payoff of the buyer for
the general case when making an unacceptable offer is allowed.
Houba and Wen (2008) apply the method of Shaked and Sutton (1984) to the wage
bargaining model of Fernandez and Glazer (1991) to derive the supremum of the union’s
SPE payoffs and the infimum of the firm’s SPE payoffs. We generalize this method to the
price negotiation model with sequences of discount rates varying in time.
Let M2ts denote the supremum of the seller’s SPE payoff in any even period 2t, where
the seller makes an offer. Let m2t+1b denote the infimum of the buyer’s SPE payoff in any
odd period (2t+ 1), where the buyer makes an offer.
First we will derive necessary conditions for M2ts and m
2t+1
b . We can notice that for
every t ∈ N
−C ≤M2ts ≤ S +D − C, R−D ≤ m
2t+1
b ≤ R + S
We have the following necessary conditions.
Proposition 3 For all (δs,t)t∈N, (δb,t)t∈N, R ≥ S ≥ D ≥ 0, 0 < C ≤ S +D, and t ∈ N,
M2ts ≤ S +D − C +
(
R−D −m2t+1b
)
∆b(2t+ 1) (13)
8
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and
m2t+1b ≥ R + S −
(
C +M2t+2s
)
∆s(2t+ 2) (14)
For the proof of Proposition 3, see the Appendix. It appears that under SPE neither
the seller nor the buyer makes an unacceptable offer, as making the least irresistible offer
gives always a higher payoff than proposing an unacceptable offer.
Next, from Proposition 3 we will calculate M2ts and m
2t+1
b for t ∈ N.
Proposition 4 For all (δs,t)t∈N, (δb,t)t∈N, R ≥ S ≥ D ≥ 0, 0 < C ≤ S +D, and t ∈ N,
M2ts = (S +D)
(
1−∆b(2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆b(2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆s(2j + 2)∆b(2j + 1)
)
− C
(15)
m2t+1b = R + S − (C +M
2t+2
s )∆s (2t+ 2) (16)
For the proof of Proposition 4, see the Appendix.
Remark 5 Note thatM2ts andm
2t+1
b calculated in Proposition 4 coincide with the results
presented in Proposition 2 on the prices offered under the SPE with no-delay. Indeed, by
combining Propositions 2 and 4 we get for each t ∈ N,
M2ts = P
2t
s − C and m
2t+1
b = R + S − P
2t+1
b
Consequently, the no-delay equilibrium strategies (ss, sb) presented in Proposition 2 sup-
port the extreme payoffs M2ts and m
2t+1
b .
4 Concluding remarks
Many of the previous studies in the literature focus on determining the reference points
and did not reveal the optimal price between sellers and buyers. Although we make some
restrictions in our model, we determine both the price level and the reference points
that have impact on the price negotiation. We use complete information and sequential
bargaining procedure where the preferences of the seller and the buyer vary in time. Using
varying discount factors gives more possibilities for the characteristics of the parties and
makes the model more realistic. Although preferences of the individuals may be constant
while buying many consumption goods, for rare and/or privileged goods the parties’
patience levels and preferences may vary during negotiations. Also some economic and
social changes caused, for instance, by climate changes, epidemic increase, varying fashion
requirements, make the preferences vary in time. Our generalized framework is therefore
more suitable to model real-life situations.
Our results concern determining the unique SPE for no-delay strategies independent
of the former history of the game and determining the equilibrium extreme payoffs of the
seller and the buyer for the general case, i.e., without the restriction to no-delay strategies.
It appears that the no-delay equilibrium strategy profiles support these extreme payoffs.
Under equilibrium, neither the seller nor the buyer makes an unacceptable offers.
For the future agenda, we would like to apply this model to one of the important
economic issues – pharmaceutical product price determination; see e.g. Jelovac (2005);
9
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Garcia-Marinoso et al. (2011). Although the drug market is quite complex, applying our
monopolistic and monopsonistic model to pharmaceutical price negotiations would help to
get a deeper insight into such negotiations. In the pharmaceutical product market, there
are two main parties that negotiate for the price: state or an agency that represents the
state and a firm that produces the drug. Although the marginal cost of drug production
is very low, R&D expenses are relatively high in comparison with the other markets.
Most of the patented drugs are produced only by one firm that creates a monopole in
the market. Especially using discount rates varying in time has more importance in the
drug market, where the consumers’ patience levels vary according to the urgency of their
illnesses and the producers’ patience levels vary according to the risk of losing the market
despite the high R&D expenses.
Appendix - Proofs
To make the paper self-contained, we present proofs of all the results stated in the present
paper. Some of the proofs are very similar to the ones concerning wage bargaining with
the exogenous ‘always strike’ decision and presented in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2012).
Proof of Proposition 1
(⇐) Let (sp, sc) be defined by (9) and (10), which can be equivalently written as
(
R− P 2ts + S
)
+
(
R− P 2ts + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb(2t+ 1, k) =
(R−D) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb(2t+ 1, k) (17)
(
P 2t+1b − C
)
+
(
P 2t+1b − C
) ∞∑
k=2t+2
δs(2t+2, k) = −C+
(
P 2t+2s − C
) ∞∑
k=2t+2
δs(2t+2, k) (18)
We show that (ss, sb) is a SPE.
Consider an arbitrary subgame starting in period 2t with the seller making an offer.
Under (ss, sb), the seller gets (P
2t
s − C) + (P
2t
s − C)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k) and the buyer
gets (R− P 2ts + S) + (R− P
2t
s + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k). If the seller deviates from ss and
proposes a certain x > P 2ts , then the seller gets−C+
(
P 2t+1b − C
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k). From
(17), 0 ≤ (D + S − P 2ts ) =
(
P 2ts − P
2t+1
b
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k), and hence P
2t
s ≥ P
2t+1
b . The
seller is then not better off by this deviation, because we have
(P 2ts − C) + (P
2t
s − C)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k) ≥ −C +
(
P 2t+1b − C
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k).
10
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Suppose that the seller deviates from ss and proposes a certain x < P
2t
s . Then
the seller gets (x− C) + (x− C)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k), but he is worse off since (x− C) +
(x− C)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k) < (P
2t
s − C) + (P
2t
s − C)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k).
Suppose that the buyer deviates from sb and rejects P
2t
s . Then he gets at most
(R−D)+
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k), which from (17) is equal to (R− P
2t
s + S)+
(R− P 2ts + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k), so the buyer is not better off by this deviation.
The analysis of an arbitrary subgame starting in 2t+1 with the buyer making an offer
is analogous to the study of the subgame starting in 2t, except that we use (18) instead
of (17).
Consider an arbitrary subgame starting in period 2t with the buyer replying to an offer
x ≤ P 2ts . Under (ss, sb) he accepts it and gets (R− x+ S)+(R− x+ S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k).
A deviation from ss does not change the result for the seller. Suppose that the buyer de-
viates from sb and rejects such x. We know that it is optimal for the buyer to propose
P 2t+1b in 2t + 1, so the buyer gets (R−D) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k). By
virtue of (17), we have (R− x+ S) + (R− x+ S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) ≥ (R− P
2t
s + S) +
(R− P 2ts + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) = (R−D) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k), and
hence the buyer is not better off by this deviation.
Consider an arbitrary subgame starting in period 2t with the buyer replying to an
offer x > P 2ts . Under (ss, sb) the buyer rejects it and proposes P
2t+1
b which is accepted.
The seller gets then −C +
(
P 2t+1b − C
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δs (2t+ 1, k) and the buyer gets (R−D) +(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1). If the buyer deviates from sb and accepts such x, then it
gets (R− x+ S)+ (R− x+ S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k). But from (17) we have (R− x+ S)+
(R− x+ S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) < (R− P
2t
s + S) + (R− P
2t
s + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) =
(R−D) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k), so the buyer is worse off.
The analysis of subgame starting in 2t+1 by the seller replying to an offer y ≥ P 2t+1b
and to an offer y < P 2t+1b is analogous to the analysis of the corresponding subgames
starting in period 2t by the buyer replying to x.
(⇒) Let (ss, sb) be a SPE. We will show that it must be defined by (17) and (18) which
are equivalent to (9) and (10). Consider an arbitrary subgame starting in period 2t
with the seller making an offer. Under (ss, sb) the seller proposes P
2t
s which is accepted
and gives (R− P 2ts + S) + (R− P
2t
s + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) to the buyer. By rejecting
11
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P 2ts , the buyer would get (R−D) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k). Since (ss, sb)
is a SPE, it must be (R− P 2ts + S) + (R− P
2t
s + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) ≥ (R−D) +(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k). Suppose that the following holds (R− P
2t
s + S) +
(R− P 2ts + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) > (R−D) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k). Then
there exists x˜ > P 2ts with (R− P
2t
s + S)+(R− P
2t
s + S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) > (R− x˜+ S)+
(R− x˜+ S)
∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k) > (R−D) +
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k). Since
x˜ > P 2ts , the buyer rejects it and gets (R−D)+
(
R− P 2t+1b + S
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δb (2t+ 1, k), but
he would be better off if he accepted this offer. Hence we get a contradiction and prove
(17). Proving (18) is analogous by considering an arbitrary subgame starting in period
2t+ 1 with the buyer making an offer. 
Proof of Proposition 2
By virtue of Proposition 1, we need to solve the infinite system of equations (9) and (10),
which can be equivalently written for each t ∈ N, as
P 2ts − P
2t+1
b ∆b (2t+ 1) = (S +D)(1−∆b(2t+ 1)) (19)
and
P 2t+1b − P
2t+2
s ∆s (2t+ 2) = 0 (20)
From (20) we get immediately (12). In order to calculate P 2ts , we use a similar matrix
method as the one applied in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2012) for the union-firm wage
bargaining. The infinite system of (19) and (20) is a regular triangular system AX = Y ,
where A = [aij]i,j∈N+ , X =
[
(xi)i∈N+
]T
, Y =
[
(yi)i∈N+
]T
, for each t, j ≥ 1
at,t = 1, at,j = 0 for j < t or j > t+ 1 (21)
for each t ∈ N
a2t+1,2t+2 = −∆b (2t+ 1) , a2t+2,2t+3 = −∆s (2t+ 2) (22)
x2t+1 = P
2t
s , x2t+2 = P
2t+1
b , y2t+1 = (S +D)(1−∆b(2t+ 1)), y2t+2 = 0 (23)
Any regular triangular matrix A possesses the (unique) inverse matrix B, which is also
regular triangular. In other words, there exists B = [bij]i,j∈N+ such that BA = I, where
I is the infinite identity matrix, and
bt,t = 1, bt,j = 0 for each t, j ≥ 1 such that j < t (24)
for each t ∈ N
b2t+1,2t+2 = ∆b (2t+ 1) , b2t+2,2t+3 = ∆s (2t+ 2) (25)
12
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and for each t,m ∈ N and m > t
b2t+2,2m+2 =
m−1∏
j=t
∆s (2j + 2)∆b (2j + 3) (26)
b2t+2,2m+3 =
m−1∏
j=t
∆s (2j + 2)∆b (2j + 3)∆s (2m+ 2) (27)
b2t+1,2m+1 =
m−1∏
j=t
∆s (2j + 2)∆b (2j + 1) (28)
b2t+1,2m+2 =
m−1∏
j=t
∆s (2j + 2)∆b (2j + 1)∆b (2m+ 1) (29)
We have then
1 −∆b (1) 0 0 · · ·
0 1 −∆s (2) 0 · · ·
0 0 1 −∆b (3) · · ·
0 0 0 1
. . .
...
...
...
... · · ·


P 0s
P 1b
P 2s
P 3b
...
 =

(S +D)(1−∆b(1))
0
(S +D)(1−∆b(3))
0
...


P 0s
P 1b
P 2s
P 3b
...
 =

1∆b (1)∆b (1)∆s (2)∆b (1)∆s (2)∆b (3) · · ·
0 1 ∆s (2) ∆s (2)∆b (3) · · ·
0 0 1 ∆b (3) · · ·
0 0 0 1
. . .
...
...
...
... · · ·


(S +D)(1−∆b(1))
0
(S +D)(1−∆b(3))
0
...

and hence we get P 2ts as given by (11).
Note that P 2ts , P
2t+1
b ∈ [0, S +D] for each t ∈ N. Obviously P
2t
s ≥ 0. Let us consider
the sequence of partial sums for k > t:
Sk = (S +D)
(
1−∆b(2t+ 1) +
k−1∑
m=t
(1−∆b(2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆s(2j + 2)∆b(2j + 1)
)
The sequence is obviously increasing, and also Sk ≤ S + D for each k > t. Hence,
P 2ts = limk→+∞ Sk ≤ S +D. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Necessary condition for M2ts
13
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.66
Consider an arbitrary even period 2t. The seller makes either an unacceptable offer or an
irresistible offer. If the buyer rejects the seller’s offer, then he will get at least (R−D)(1−
∆b(2t+ 1)) +m
2t+1
b ∆b(2t+ 1). Hence, the seller gets at most R+ S − C − (R−D)(1−
∆b(2t+ 1))−m
2t+1
b ∆b(2t+ 1) from making the least acceptable offer. Alternatively, the
seller gets at most −C(1−∆s(2t+1)) + (R+ S −C −m
2t+1
b )∆s(2t+1) from making an
unacceptable offer. Hence, we get
M2ts ≤ max
{
R + S − C − (R−D)(1−∆b(2t+ 1)−m
2t+1
b ∆b(2t+ 1)
−C(1−∆s(2t+ 1)) + (R + S − C −m
2t+1
b )∆s(2t+ 1)
(30)
which can be equivalently written as
M2ts ≤ max
{
S +D − C +
(
R−D −m2t+1b
)
∆b(2t+ 1)
−C +
(
R + S −m2t+1b
)
∆s(2t+ 1)
(31)
which leads to
M2ts ≤
{
S +D − C +
(
R−D −m2t+1b
)
∆b(2t+ 1) if (33)
−C +
(
R + S −m2t+1b
)
∆s(2t+ 1) otherwise
(32)
where
S(1−∆s(2t+ 1)) +D(1−∆b(2t+ 1)) ≥
(
R−m2t+1b
)
(∆s(2t+ 1)−∆b(2t+ 1)) (33)
However, we can show that (33) always holds.
Let∆s(2t+1) ≤ ∆b(2t+1). We know that−S ≤ R−m
2t+1
b ≤ D. If 0 ≤ R−m
2t+1
b ≤ D,
then the right hand side of (33) is not positive. Hence, since the left hand side of (33) is
not negative, (33) holds. If −S ≤ R−m2t+1b < 0, then we have
0 ≤
(
R−m2t+1b
)
(∆s(2t+ 1)−∆b(2t+ 1)) ≤ −S(∆s(2t+ 1)−∆b(2t+ 1)) = S(∆b(2t+
1) − ∆s(2t + 1)) ≤ S(1 − ∆s(2t + 1)) ≤ S(1 − ∆s(2t + 1)) + D(1 − ∆b(2t + 1)), and
therefore (33) also holds.
Let ∆s(2t+1) > ∆b(2t+1). If −S ≤ R−m
2t+1
b < 0, then the right hand side of (33)
is negative, and therefore (33) holds, since the left hand side of (33) is not negative. If
0 ≤ R−m2t+1b ≤ D, then we have
0 ≤
(
R−m2t+1b
)
(∆s(2t+ 1)−∆b(2t+ 1)) ≤ D(∆s(2t+1)−∆b(2t+1)) ≤ D(1−∆b(2t+
1)) ≤ S(1−∆s(2t+ 1)) +D(1−∆b(2t+ 1)), and therefore (33) also holds.
Necessary condition for m2t+1b
Consider an arbitrary odd period 2t + 1. The buyer makes either an unacceptable offer
or an irresistible offer. If the seller rejects the buyer’s offer, then he will get at most
−C(1−∆s(2t+2))+M
2t+2
s ∆s(2t+2). Hence, the buyer gets at least R+S−C +C(1−
∆s(2t+ 2))−M
2t+2
s ∆s(2t+ 2) from making the least irresistible offer. Alternatively, the
buyer gets at least (R−D)(1−∆b(2t+2))+(R+S−C−M
2t+2
s )∆b(2t+2) from making
an unacceptable offer. Hence, we get
m2t+1b ≥ max
{
R + S − (C +M2t+2s )∆s(2t+ 2)
R−D + (S +D − C −M2t+2s )∆b(2t+ 2)
(34)
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which leads to
m2t+1b ≥
{
R + S − (C +M2t+2s )∆s(2t+ 2) if (36)
R−D + (S +D − C −M2t+2s )∆b(2t+ 2) otherwise
(35)
where
(S +D) (1−∆b(2t+ 2)) ≥
(
C +M2t+2s
)
(∆s(2t+ 2)−∆b(2t+ 2)) (36)
However, note that (36) is always satisfied, since S+D ≥ C+M2t+2s and 1−∆b(2t+2) ≥
∆s(2t+ 2)−∆b(2t+ 2). This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4
When looking for the upper bound of M2ts and the lower bound of m
2t+1
b , we need to
solve the following infinite system: for each t ∈ N
M2ts = S +D − C +
(
R−D −m2t+1b
)
∆b(2t+ 1)
and
m2t+1b = R + S −
(
C +M2t+2s
)
∆s(2t+ 2)
Hence, we get immediately (16), and if −C ≤M2ts ≤ S +D−C, then R−D ≤ m
2t+1
b ≤
R + S. Furthermore, we have
1∆b (1) 0 0 · · ·
0 1 ∆s (2) 0 · · ·
0 0 1 ∆b (3) · · ·
0 0 0 1
. . .
...
...
...
... · · ·


M0s
m1b
M2s
m3b
...
 =

S +D − C + (R−D)∆b(1)
R + S − C∆s(2)
S +D − C + (R−D)∆b(3)
R + S − C∆s(4)
...


M0s
m1b
M2s
m3b
...
 =

1 −∆b (1)∆b (1)∆s (2) −∆b (1)∆s (2)∆b (3) · · ·
0 1 −∆s (2) ∆s (2)∆b (3) · · ·
0 0 1 −∆b (3) · · ·
0 0 0 1
. . .
...
...
...
... · · ·


S +D − C + (R−D)∆b(1)
R + S − C∆s(2)
S +D − C + (R−D)∆b(3)
R + S − C∆s(4)
...

which gives us (15). Obviously, M2ts ≥ −C, and similarly to the proof of Proposition 2,
one can show that M2ts ≤ S +D − C. 
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